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BARGAINING WITH THE STATE. By Richard A. Epstein. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 322. $29. 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that the govern-
ment may not require individuals to give up their constitutional rights 
in exchange for certain government benefits, even though the govern-
ment is under no obligation to provide those benefits in the first place. 
For example, although a state does not have to grant property tax 
exemptions to veterans, it cannot grant exemptions to veterans on the 
condition that they take a loyalty oath.1 The doctrine implies that the 
greater power to deny benefits altogether does not necessarily include 
the lesser power to grant benefits only on certain conditions. 2 
Since the first articulation of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, courts and commentators have struggled to define a consistent 
principle for determining which conditions on state action are permis-
sible. 3 The Supreme Court's approach reflects concern with the bar-
gaining risks associated with conditions, generally concluding that 
those conditions that appear to coerce the individual into waiving a 
right in order to receive a government benefit transgress constitutional 
boundaries.4 Other related analyses suggest that imposing certain 
choices on individuals offends their "dignit':lcy" interests. 5 Broader 
approaches have denied the adequacy of a single determinate princi-
ple, suggesting judicial review of conditional government action using 
multiple criteria. 6 
1. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
2. Justice Holmes rejected this formulation of the doctrine: "Even in the law the whole 
generally includes its parts. If the State may prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of avoid-
ing the prohibition in a certain way." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex reL Coleman, 216 
U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
3. Early examinations of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine include Robert L. Hale, 
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935), and 
Maurice H. Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1929). Other notable 
analyses of the issue - only the most recent in a long list - include Vicki Been, "Exit" as a 
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 
COLUM. L. R:Ev. 473 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
R:Ev. 1413 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anach-
ronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 
(1990). 
4. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1428-42 (discussing the coercion approach in unconstitu-
tional conditions cases). 
5. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 
61 B.U. L. R:Ev. 885 (1981). Mashaw's article examines the constitutional rights involved in 
government employment, one of the many contexts in which the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions operates. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
6. See Seth F. Kreimer, A/locational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive 
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984) (arguing for review using baselines of equality, history, 
and prediction to differentiate between government threats and offers); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 
1489-505 (arguing for heightened scrutiny of conditions that (i) affect the balance of power be-
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Richard Epstein's7 most recent entry into this fray, Bargaining 
with the State, 8 analyzes unconstitutional conditions as a bargaining 
problem, as the book's title implies, but rejects the idea that common 
law concepts of coercion and duress sufficiently explain the doctrine 
(p. 13). Adhering to a formalist approach to contract law,9 Epstein 
claims that a condition obtained through coercive bargaining could 
"be set aside as a matter of right, regardless of its content" (p. 13). In 
contrast to the coercive bargaining model, Epstein's view of the prob-
lem of unconstitutional conditions focuses on the substantive condi-
tions imposed, much like the private law concept of unconscionability 
(p. 13). Thus Epstein proposes an "overtly functional and utilitarian" 
(p. 17) approach that would analyze conditions on the basis of ex-
pected "social improvement" (p. 16). 
The central theory of Bargaining with the State is that courts 
should invalidate conditions that reduce or improperly divide the so-
cial surplus created by "efficient" government intervention into private 
ordering. Epstein expressly rejects the notion that a conditional regu-
lation is permissible so long as it does not leave individuals or groups 
worse off than they would have been without any regulation. 10 He 
argues instead that courts should invalidate conditions that reduce the 
social value produced by such efficient state action as, for example, the 
creation and regulation of highways. 11 The proper baseline, according 
to Epstein, is "not the status quo ante, but a best achievable state of 
affairs in which the program is put forward without the conditions 
attached" (p. 102). Any condition that reduces the state of affairs be-
low the ideal is, for Epstein, an unconstitutional condition. 
The analysis in Bargaining with the State follows from - and is 
often dependent upon - the exhaustive analysis of state action in Ep-
tween government and rightholders, (ii) skew the distribution of rights among rightholders, or 
(iii) create a caste hierarchy); Sunstein, supra note 3 (arguing that no determinate principle exists 
in the post· New Deal state so courts should review government justifications on a case-by-case 
basis). 
7. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
8. This book is the culmination of Epstein's earlier work on the subject. See Richard A. 
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 189 
(1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term -Foreword: Unconstitutional Con· 
ditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988). 
9. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 293 
(1975) (arguing for a restricted notion of what constitutes an unconscionable contract). 
10. Cf. Kreimer, supra note 6, at 1353 (defining unconstitutional conditions as those moving 
the recipient below some natural baseline, rather than declining to move her above the baseline). 
11. For example, conditioning use of state highways by nonstate residents on agreement to 
service of process for lawsuits arising out of highway use might be a benign condition, because it 
is directly related to the effective operation of the highway. Conditioning such use on agreement 
to service of process in all lawsuits, however, could deter nonresidents from using the state's 
highways, proportionately reducing the benefits of the creation of highways for use by all. The 
second example might therefore represent an unconstitutional condition. Cf. pp. 14, 128-31, 161· 
76. 
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stein's 1985 book Takings. 12 In Takings, Epstein concludes that the 
just compensation requirement of the Takings Clause prohibits gov-
ernment action that does not create sufficient social surplus for the 
state to compensate the "losers" under the regulation. 13 By contrast, 
Bargaining with the State analyzes those situations in which govern-
ment action does create a net surplus, and this time Epstein concludes 
that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits actions that 
reduce that surplus. In this book, Epstein seeks to empower courts to 
"see that useful projects go forward in a sensible fashion, not to strike 
down unwise projects that should not go forward at all" (p. xiv), hav-
ing already made the latter effort in Takings. 
Epstein begins this project by establishing in the first third of Bar-
gaining with the State a detailed theoretical framework for deciding 
whether attached conditions reduce the social surplus created by state 
action (pp. 3-103). This ~ection attempts to refine the meariing of ~oer­
cion in the context of bargaining with the state. Conceding that com-
mon law concepts of duress and fraud do not apply in cases when a 
citizen may freely choose to reject the government's conditional offer, 
Epstein analogizes to other contexts in which the law properly rejects 
agreements that are not strictly coercive but that are the product of 
noncompetitive bargaining. Epstein contends, ·for example, that the 
common law grant of privilege in situations of necessity exists to avoid 
inefficient agreements arising from the monopoly bargaining situation 
(pp. 54-56). Blackmail, another example, involv~ nonproductive bar-
gaining games between parties in a bilateral monopoly, so the law 
properly allows disclosure or silence but prohibits silence conditioned 
upon payment (pp. 61-63). In both cases, according to Epstein, the 
law rejects agreements because they are socially inefficient, even 
though they are not coercive in a traditional contract law sense.14 
The lesson Epstein draws from the common law is that when a 
state has monopoly power in a given area, 15 bargaining difficulties may 
result in conditional regulations that produce less social benefit than 
all-or-nothing regulations. Thus the degree of expected social im-
12. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985). 
13. P. xiv. See EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 161-81. Epstein candidly confesses in Bargaining 
with the State that his view of just compensation would allow unelected judges to keep demo-
cratic bodies "from undertaking foolish projects (i.e., those that cause more harm than they do 
good)." Pp. xiii-xiv. 
14. Agreements resulting from necessity or blackmail are not technically coercive because 
they are not fraudulently or forcibly induced. Rather, Epstein argues, the law rejects these agree-
ments because of the tremendous costs associated with noncompetitive bargaining in these situa-
tions. Pp. 56, 63. 
15. A state has monopoly power when a regime of common ownership will produce efficient 
allocation of the good more easily than will a regime of private ownership. Thus, for example, 
states generally have monopoly power over waterways because a system of private rights would 
not normally produce the optimum use of waterways. See pp. 34-35, 52-54. 
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provement becomes the determinate baseline by which courts should 
accept or reject conditional regulations (p. 102). Epstein therefore 
proposes a two-part test for unconstitutional conditions: first, courts 
should "establish some use of monopoly power by the state" (p. 102); 
second, courts must examine the conditions individuals must accept 
along with the proffered benefit with the goal of "ensur[ing] full pres-
ervation of the social surplus" created by the state's entrance into the 
private market (p. 102). 
In the latter two-thirds of the book, Epstein applies this analysis to 
a myriad of cases, organized loosely into three categories. The first 
category discusses "Government Relations Within a Federal System" 
(pp. 105-57). In this section Epstein focuses primarily on the 
problems of discriminatory taxation that typically fall under the dor-
mant commerce clause doctrine. 16 Epstein argues, for example, that 
although states have monopoly power to provide highways, unconsti-
tutional conditions should prevent states from conditioning the use of 
highways by nonstate residents on the payment of a special tax.17 Ep-
stein reasons that the power to tax discriminatorily will force states 
into a prisoner's dilemma, in which "each [state] is tempted to raise 
the fees on out-of-state carriers regardless of whether other states do 
the same" (p. 129). Denying states the power to tax foreign truckers 
discriminatorily would reduce the threat that such strategic behavior 
will ultimately create "a total burden of taxation ... sufficiently great 
to drive out of business substantial portions of interstate transporta-
tion and trade" (p. 129). The unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
thereby preserves the full social surplus produced by public ownership 
of highways. 
In the second category of cases, "Economic Liberties and Property 
Rights,'' Epstein applies his test of socially efficient bargaining to re-
ject rate regulation of private carriers, conditions on land use permits, 
pro bono requirement conditions on attorney licenses, and conditions 
on employee wages for government contractors (pp. 159-236). In each 
of these cases, according to Epstein, courts should reject these condi-
tions because they each reduce public welfare by unnecessarily inter-
fering with competitive outcomes. 
In his final category of cases, Epstein examines "Positive Rights in 
the Welfare State" (pp. 237-312). In this section he rejects the idea 
16. The dormant commerce clause doctrine, loosely defined, holds that the Constitution's 
grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce among the states prohibits states from 
passing laws that interfere with interstate commerce, even in the absence of congressional action. 
See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987) (invali· 
dating a state tax that discriminated against interstate commerce as a violation of the dormant 
commerce clause). 
17. Cf. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (invalidating state truck-
ing operation taxes that had the effect of imposing a higher tax on out-of-state truckers). Epstein 
discusses Scheiner at pp. 136-39. 
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underlying Goldberg v. Kelly 18 that the government may not grant 
welfare benefits on the condition that recipients relinquish certain pro-
cedural protections in the administration of their benefits. Epstein 
contends that courts should defer to state action in this context, insist-
ing that the risks of political abuse are small19 compared with the tre-
mendous risk of recipient abuse (pp. 283-84). 
One theme in this section sure to provoke controversy is the role 
and effect of religion in the problem of unconstitutional conditions. 
Epstein rejects the idea of a strict separation between church and state, 
contending instead that courts should strike down only those state 
benefits - tax exemptions, for example - that selectively subsidize or 
penalize religious institutions. Epstein believes the Supreme Court 
was therefore wrong to uphold, in Bob Jones University v. United 
States, 20 the selective denial of a charitable tax exemption to the uni-
versity on the basis of its overt racial discrimination. According to 
Epstein, the Court should have overturned the prohibition on race dis-
crimination as an unconstitutional condition on receipt of the tax ex-
emption because Bob Jones University allegedly practiced racial 
discrimination for constitutionally protected religious reasons (pp. 
249-51). 
Although an attack on the Court's decision in Bob Jones cries out 
for a response,21 Bargaining with the State's exhaustive survey of the 
cases involving the unconstitutional conditions doctrine deserves a 
more comprehensive assessment. The central project of the book is to 
establish and justify a single functional baseline that focuses courts' 
attention on the relative degree of social improvement produced by 
conditional regulation. In this project the book is principally opposed 
to more flexible approaches that recommend multiple baselines or cri-
teria by which courts should scrutinize government action under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 22 There is undeniable appeal in 
establishing a determinate standard in this complicated area, and Ep-
stein makes a strong case in defense of his utilitarian social improve-
ment standard. Certainly the analysis is thorough, and it is 
undoubtedly compelling given a political outlook consistent with both 
neoclassical economic assumptions and public choice skepticism of 
democratic mechanisms. 
Epstein's insistence on a consistent and determinate principle, one 
18. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
19. To prove his counterintuitive claim that one can expect the political process to act favor-
ably toward welfare recipients, Epstein observes that "the political process ... has developed 
extensive rules governing the withdrawal of benefits,'' including written statements of reasons 
and review by another welfare official after notice to the recipient. P. 284. 
20. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
21. Indeed, the book's dust jacket trumpets Epstein's attack on the Bob Jones decision, essen-
tially inviting critical response. 
22. See supra note 6. 
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that is "functional, not intuitive," (p. 16) ultimately fails to persuade, 
however, because the book never delivers a coherent, nonintuitive the-
ory of how courts are supposed to assess social improvement, or why 
they should even try in a post-Lochner world. Epstein's theory focuses 
on the ways in which difficulties in bargaining with the state reduce 
the prospects for maximum social improvement. As such, his theory 
therefore depends upon a rigorous and detailed system for evaluating 
social improvement. Yet as Epstein himself recognizes, social choices 
often reflect markedly different types of valuations,23 such that it be-
comes almost impossible to compare the outcomes of different social 
choices. If social choices are therefore difficult to value consistently, 
one immediately wonders how courts are supposed to decide whether 
a particular social choice creates the requisite amount of social im-
provement. Thus, even if one accepts social improvement as a stan-
dard, the problem of social choice valuation suggests a complicated 
relationship between democratic decisionmaking and judicial over-
sight. At a minimum, a consistently strong role for courts in this envi-
ronment demands a strong defense, but here Epstein retreats from 
reasoning and hides behind aphorism: "In a world rife with imperfec-
tions, it is a serious mistake to treat the best as the enemy of the 
good. "24 But the best - presumably a perfectly consistent standard 
- is not this book's real enemy. Rather, Epstein's standard of social 
improvement must compete with other standards he rejects early on as 
insufficiently determinate.25 Yet the reader never learns why an inde-
terminate social improvement standard is better, for example, than an 
indeterminate system of historically and institutionally respectful 
criteria. 
Some examples may demonstrate the malleability of Epstein's stan-
23. Pp. 96-97 ("It is just that gap between market and subjective values that explained why 
environmentalists could in principle oppose improvements that increased the market value of 
their holdings."). Even here, however, Epstein appears to miss the crucial insight that not only 
may subjective valuation conceal value from the market but people's subjective valuation may 
operate on an entirely different plane from that of the market. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, 
VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcONOMICS 117-40 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, lncommensurability and 
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). Thus, environmentalists may believe that no 
measure of additional compensation beyond the market value will account for the subjective 
valuation of their holdings. Some economists may wish simply to label this behavior irrational, 
but they do so at the peril of condemning a great deal of human interaction, not unlike the insane 
man who thinks it is everybody else who is crazy. 
24. P. 87. This answer is especially disappointing because earlier Epstein promises to offer 
"some explanation as to why the risk of judicial abuse is an acceptable price to pay to control the 
legislative abuses that all too often do occur." P. 19. Yet ultimately his explanation is simply 
that "the strength of the combined problems of faction and knowledge" justify judicial interven· 
tion to ensure social improvement. P. 87. It remains unclear, however, why a public choice 
critique of legislative behavior justifies a standard of social improvement, as opposed to any other 
criterion or several criteria. 
25. Seep. 14 ("[T]he use of balancing tests in this context leaves far too much room for the 
legal imagination."); p. 16 (arguing that one commentator's "inability to offer a single baseline 
for assessing conditional government benefits renders his account problematic •••• The desired 
theory •.. has to be functional, not intuitive."). 
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dard. Chapter Fourteen analyzes government employment contracts, 
concluding that under the monopoly test for unconstitutional condi-
tions, the doctrine usually should not apply because the state does not 
have monopoly hiring power in the competitive labor market (pp. 214, 
227). As a result, Epstein denies any constitutional concern with pro-
cedural due process in the hiring and firing of government employees 
(p. 225), a position rejected by an eight-to-one vote in the Supreme 
Court.26 Epstein claims, without empirical suppor,t, that the govern-
ment "hires workers in an intensely competitive emjronment"27 and 
that "individual employees are capable of deciding whether procedural 
benefits are more important than the wage and other benefits provided 
by the job" (p. 227). Yet the constitutional grounding for empirically 
refutable neoclassical assertions seems no more stable than, as but one 
example, that underlying baselines of equality, history, and predic-
tion. 28 Indeed, both a historicai view of goverrim.ent employment 
standards and an equality-based analysis of the bargaining relationship 
seem to justify judicial restriction on the government's bargaining with 
individual employees who lack access to the resources and information 
available to the government. It is similarly unclear from Epstein's text 
why economic theory has higher constitutional status than notions of 
individual dignity that the Court might also use to insist on fair disci-
plinary procedures. 29 
The normative claims inherent in the social valuation standard fur-
ther reveal themselves in a chapter on land use restrictions (pp. 177-
95). Epstein defends the Supreme Court's decision in Nol/an v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission, 30 in which the Court held that the Com-
mission did not have the power to give a coastal developer permission 
to build conditioned on a requirement that the developer deed an ease-
ment to the state, when the condition lacked a sufficient nexus with the 
state's goals.31 As a result of Nol/an, state agencies must either refuse 
26. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
27. P. 225. Epstein uses the very existence of some procedural protections to prove the com-
petitiveness of the labor market in this context. P. 225; cf. supra note 19. He thereby ignores 
other norms that could be at work, including the political judgment that workers simply deserve 
certain protections before being fired - protections that government can enforce against itself, if 
not all private employers. The government may of course also enforce some version of that norm 
against government contractors, - a position Epstein also rejects. Pp. 218-19 (criticizing pre-
vailing wage and affirmative action requirements for government contractors). 
28. Cf. Kreimer, supra note 6. 
29. P. 226 (rejecting the dignitary theory in Mashaw, supra note 5). 
30. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
31. 483 U.S. at 837. In an opinion handed down immediately prior to publication of this 
Notice, the Supreme Court extended Nol/an,_ holding that even when a sufficient nexus exists, 
conditions on land use permits are unconstitutional if they do not satisfy a test of "rough propor-
tionality" between the conditions exacted and the projected impact of the land use. Dolan v. 
Tigard, No. 93-518, slip op. at 16 (U.S. June 24, 1994). Epstein's analysis of Nol/an dovetails 
with Dolan, which purports to set "outer limits" on how democratic entities may fulfill certain 
public goals. Dolan, slip op. at 21. 
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to give permission to build altogether or grant permission without cer-
tain conditions. According to Epstein, Nollan is correct because it 
"narrows the size of the bargaining range," reducing inefficient bar-
gaining games by removing the conditional grant from the state's side 
of the table (pp. 183-84). 
Developers, however, would appear to be no less capable of evalu-
ating a conditioned benefit than individual government employees are. 
Developers can arguably "exit" the market to develop elsewhere if the 
bargain is not fair from their perspective,32 and the empirical claim 
that there is a competitive market for development opportunities 
sounds at least as plausible as Epstein's claim about the competitive-
ness of the government employee labor market. 33 Epstein rejects the 
"exit" argument here, however, first pointing out that the plaintiff in 
Nollan had no credible threat of exit because he was a "sitting tenant" 
(p. 185). Surely, however, the exit threat is no more credible for indi-
vidual government employees mistreated on the job. Epstein also ar-
gues that annexation and extended jurisdictions make it difficult for 
developers to flee the bargain (pp. 185-86). Again, surely individual 
employees often face equally high obstacles to exit should they attempt 
to change jobs midcareer. In addition, Epstein declares that the exit 
right is insufficient because regulations may be imposed after "exten-
sive planning has been made in reliance on the previous state of af-
fairs" (p. 185). Such reliance, however, must pale in comparison to 
the personal investments individual employees make in their jobs and 
lives. 
Epstein is thus left with a general claim about social loss that oc-
curs when hard bargains force developers to move to their second-
choice locations (p. 186). Yet for some reason Epstein seems reluctant 
to account for similar social loss that should likewise occur when con-
ditions force individual employees out of jobs they would otherwise 
prefer. A more serious objection to Epstein's analysis of land use re-
strictions, however, is that the representatives of the people - in No/-
Ian, the Coastal Commission - may simply place a social value on the 
condition that is higher, or different, than the cumulative loss to devel-
opers forced to exit. 34 Epstein's analysis reduces to a sustained claim 
that courts should impose rules that increase market valuation mea-
sured along a single metric, even though they have little authority to 
do so in the post-New Deal world,35 and even though differing modes 
of social valuation make it often impossible for them to do so. 
The above observation about post-New Deal jurisprudence drama-
tizes one other problem with the analysis in Bargaining with the State. 
32. See Been, supra note 3, at 506-33. 
33. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
34. Cf. supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
35. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 600-01. 
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Although Epstein insists that "many of the arguments advanced in 
this book survive even if I am wrong in my stubborn allegiance to 
discarded [pre-1937 constitutional] doctrine" {p. 23), controversial 
theoretical tools for disciplining legislative behavior pervade Bargain-
ing with the State, often leaving the reader confused about the real 
purpose - and practical usefulness - of the project. Epstein relies in 
particular on two claims that have failed to shift the mainstream: the 
first, unsurprisingly, is taxation as a takings risk; the second is the 
related "public trust" doctrine. 
Epstein imports from Takings the claim that taxation is only per-
missible to "raise the revenues necessary to purchase public goods" 
and that courts should invalidate almost every other form of taxation 
on the basis of its coercive threat. 36 Although he concedes that the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine has much less effect in limiting 
Congress's power to tax in the modem era {p. 146), his argument 
nonetheless depends on it in certain key areas. For example, Epstein · 
defends the Supreme Court's decisions in Rust v. Sullivan 37 and Harris 
v. McRae, 38 two abortion-related cases upholding the government's 
power to grant federal money with conditions that restrict the recipi-
ents' exercise of constitutional rights relating to abortion counseling 
and the abortion choice itself. Epstein argues that the conditions in 
these cases were justified because they took into account the coercive 
takings effect on those who oppose the use of their taxes for what they 
consider to be murder.39 
In contrast to his use of the takings risk of taxation to justify these 
conditions, Epstein uses the public trust doctrine to condemn other 
legislative judgments as unconstitutional conditions. Under the public 
trust doctrine as Epstein defines it, taxpayers imbue the state with a 
public trust much as trust beneficiaries imbue a private trustee with 
fiduciary responsibilities.40 Accordingly, all government decisions 
must improve the value of taxpayer holdings. Epstein contends that 
public trust creates a potential bargaining problem because individual 
taxpayers may not be direct parties to the bargain, even though the 
state may violate their trust as a result {pp. 70, 217). Unconstitutional 
conditions, then, should also require the state to account for its public 
trust responsibilities in its bargains with individual citizens. Relying 
on the public trust doctrine, Epstein finds prevailing wage require-
ments in government contracts and laws permitting public employee 
36. Pp. 145-46 (citing EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 283-305). 
37. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
38. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
39. Pp. 285-94 (discussing Harris); pp. 297-302 (discussing Rust). 
40. Pp. 70, 217. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 421 
(1987) (stating that officials in charge of public trust must act "for the benefit of all the individu-
als who had .•. some undivided interests" in the resource sold to private individuals). 
1864 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1855 
collective bargaining constitutionally repugnant because they violate 
the government's supposed duty to invest public money efficiently (pp. 
214-20). 
Epstein's analysis of taxation as takings and his view of the re-
quirements of public trust are both controversial claims. Epstein's 
analysis and application of public trust in particular depends on a con-
ception of value that is open to serious dispute.41 Perhaps more im-
portantly, however, the controversial nature of both claims 
demonstrates the book's conflicted agenda. Several arguments tum on 
public trust or taxation as takings, which casts doubt on the claim that 
the thesis of the book applies with equal vigor to both pre- and post-
1937 settings. Even though Epstein promises not to declare the New 
Deal unconstitutional a second time (p. xiv), few New Deal statutes 
would survive either theory. As a result the reader is often left unsure 
whether the argument she has just read would make sense to a modem 
court. In this project, Epstein suffers from the conflict of the revolu-
tionary-from-within: he cannot seem to justify full participation in the 
system he despises. 
Accepting the normative judgments underlying his view of social 
valuation, however, the arguments fall neatly into place within Ep-
stein's framework. Bargaining with the State follows the important 
precedent set by Takings, offering an examination of the complicated 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions impressive for its thoroughness 
and for its consistent devotion to a principle that is at least articulable, 
even though controversial. Perhaps by now Epstein bas tired of de-
fending neoclassical constitutionalism; perhaps he simply expects 
readers to accept this position on faith and to test the arguments that 
follow from it. If so, Epstein's analysis of unconstitutional conditions 
passes easily. 
Readers, however, may expect a more complete argument from a 
book-length effort. Certainly an enterprise predicated in part on re-
placing multiple or flexible standards for unconstitutional conditions 
with a more functional standard should give a closely reasoned expla-
nation of how that standard should function. Yet in an area truly rife 
with imperfections, Bargaining with the State offers no new argument 
against the post-1937 insight: in most circumstances, democratic bod-
ies interpret variable assessments of social value better than unelected 
judges. 
- Jonathan D. Hacker 
41. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
